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The "Old" Master, a veteran of the academic and judicial wars, is at it
again. Asked what he thought of Judge Posner's scholarship, an even Older
Master, Nobel laureate in economics Ronald Coase, replied: "I don't know; he
writes faster than I can read."' It was perhaps inevitable that Judge Posner
2
would turn his penetrating, provocative, and restless intellect from literature,
jurisprudence, 3 judging, 4 and sex' to old age. 6 As befits someone growing
older-Posner is hardly "old" at 56-the new book is more personalized, with
stories about the Judge's aging relatives and his cats, and (perhaps) more
modest7 than some of his earlier works. Although when one considers his
hypothesis, "that economics can do a better job of explaining the behavior and
attitudes associated with aging, and of solving the policy problems that aging

* Copyright 0 1996 by Paul H. Brietzke and Linda S. Whitton. All rights reserved.
Paul H. Brietzke is Professor of Law and Linda S. Whitton is Associate Professor of Law
at Valparaiso University School of Law. Among their areas of expertise, Brietzke teaches law and
economics and Whitton teaches elder law.
1. Ronald Coase, After-dinner speech at the American Law and Economics Association
Conference, New Haven, Connecticut (May 15, 1992) (response to question from audience, as heard
by Brietzke).
2. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION

(1988).
3. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE(1990); RICHARD A. POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW (1995).
4. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985); RICHARD
A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (1990) [hereinafter CARDOZO]; RICHARD A.

POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
5. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).
6. See RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE (1995) [hereinafter AGING].
7. See, e.g., id. at 363 (commenting that the old are a vast and rapidly changing topic, "and
my own limitations of knowledge, technique, and time have caused my reach to exceed my grasp").
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presents, than biology, psychology, sociology, philosophy, or any other single

field of natural or social science,'

such modesty is taken to task.

To provide a more interesting travelogue of Posner's ambitious journey,
this review is divided into two sections, each with decidedly different scenery.
The first, Law and Economics-Modifications and Applications, evaluates the
impact of Aging and Old Age (hereinafter Aging) on human capital theory, as
well as the broader field of law and economics. The second, Law and
Aging-Stereotypes and Implications, critiques the underlying premises of Aging
and their significance for contemporary treatment of the aging and aged in our
society.
1. LAW AND ECONOMICS-MODIFICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS

A. Modifications
Judge Posner is concerned about matters of reputation, 9 and he is surely
aware that his own reputation most securely rests on his systematizing of the
standard (Chicago School,'" neoclassical and arguably neoconservative) version
of law and economics. Over the years, he has capably revised this standard
version to take account of his critics" and to deal with an ever-widening list
of topics. Such revisions are prominent in Aging and, while many of these
occur at the "margin" and are thus of interest mainly to economists, four seem
worth mentioning here. While these modifications are introduced to enrich the
"human capital" theory12 that helped Chicagoan Gary Becker win the 1992

8. AGING, supra note 6, at 1-2.
9. See generally CARDOZO, supra note 4.
10. See Nobel Savages, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1996, at 72 (noting that the nine Chicago
School Nobel Prizes in Economics since 1974, and the five since 1990, can be attributed to "a
fondness for dissent, an anti-establishment culture and a distaste for public-policy research" which
merely confirms existing theories). All of this "is geared towards the slaying of sacred cows," id.,
a Judge Posner specialty.
11. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of the Efficiency Theory
of the Common Law, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 775 (1981); Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses
of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (1979); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism,
Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 1. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979). Returning to the topic of
utilitarianism in AGING, Posner argues: "All the hard knocks that utilitarianism has taken from
philosophers have not much diminished the importance that the average person, and indeed the
above-average and even the philosophical person, attaches to happiness." AGING, supra note 6, at
362. This is certainly true, but it does not reach the important question of how this "happiness" is
to be defined. Many philosophers properly (from their perspectives) reject Posner's market-based,
and now age-graded, definition.
12. AGING, supra note 6, at 51-65. Owing the "greatest debt of all" to Becker, id. at 13,
Posner cites GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION (3d ed. 1993), AGING, supra note 6, at 51 n. 1. In brief,
investments in human capital include income foregone during education and on-the-job training. Id.
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Nobel Prize in Economics, they are quickly folded into a broader law and
economics. Becker stresses that individuals and their employers "invest" in new
knowledge, skills, and relationships so as to obtain a stream of earnings in the
future, and that 3such investments decline with age because the payoff period has
gotten shorter.'
Judge Posner's first modification involves an attempt to build an economic
psychology of old age, to counter the taking of "values, preferences, and
attitudes for granted"' 4 in the standard version of law and economics. Finding
but few studies of aging in modern psychology, studies which are "not
persuasive" because they hold that aging has no significant effect on personality,
the Judge has recourse to an Aristotle who is politically incorrect when he
stereotypes the subject.' 5 This exercise is largely successful for Posner's
purposes since, like much of philosophy and psychology, economics frequently
stereotypes "normal" behavior, so as to deal with it more easily and in the
aggregate.- Lawyers qua lawyers might be uncomfortable with this tactic-many
of us are dis-aggregators by profession, having been exposed to the wonderful
but bewildering diversity of human experience while reading so many weird
cases.
From Aristotle we learn that the elderly are cynical and small-minded
because they have often been fooled and otherwise humbled, they lack
confidence in the future and are reluctant to take risks or support reformist
schemes for largely the same reasons, and their "fluid" intelligence
(imagination) declines while their inflexible "crystallized" intelligence
(experience) increases.16 In more specifically economic terms, the old are selfcentered because they have entered the "last period" of life; "their own survival
and happiness ... [are] the only goods of certain goodness to them." 7 Posner
argues that the foregoing are "fundamental attributes of being old,"'" and
builds them into subsequent analyses of specific topics. Posner's tack is thus to

at 52. If this capital is "job-specific" and thus cannot be used if the employee switches employers,
the employer is more willing to invest and the employee is less willing. Id. Human capital
depreciates over time, owing to changing work environments and a loss of memory or dexterity.
Id. at 53. Part of human capital is "relational": marriage, friendship, and business links, id. at 61,
or what some call "networking."
13. See generally BECKER, supra note 12.
14. AGING, supra note 6, at 99. See id. at 99-121.
15. Id. at 101-02. See id. at 101 (Aristotle's Rhetoric "minces no words" and is "frankly
stereotypical," but it contains "an important part of the truth.").
16. Id. at 6, 70, 102-04, 106-07.
17. Id. at 107-08. But if one good stereotype deserves another, some of the elderly are more
altruistic and caring than are "yuppies," due to their formative enculturation during the New Deal
and the Great Society rather than during the Reagan Revolution-or the Boesky-Millken era.
18. Id. at 99.
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model the psychology of the old, in his words, "as a consequence rather than
foundation of rational choice. " 19
The second and most interesting modification of the standard version treats
a hitherto-integrated economic man (perhaps a sexist concept) as a succession
of competing and selfish selves, selves who are "time-sharing" the same
body.'
In part because of the prolonging of life, different selves reach
increasingly different decisions in increasingly different ways. 2' This shows
the "limitations of expected-utility maximizing as a normative tool,"' but the
analysis turns rather murky when Judge Posner considers the extent to which the
interests of future selves should be taken into account by ethics and law: "The
young self will not be permitted fully to control the old one," who finds a
greater utility in the money the two are (hypothetically) quarreling over.'
Based on an analogy to the life tenant's liability for waste, rather than on a
governmental paternalism, there is "a limited fiduciary duty on the young self"
not to commit the older self to penury.'
The Judge raises, but does not
resolve, the even thornier issue of the older self's claim on governmental
resources; he concludes that "perhaps we can do no better than to allow the
political process to arbitrate the competing claims of successive selves. "'
These successive selves are a shaky basis for governmental subsidies or for
legally-enforceable rights and duties, and these selves also do violence to the
Chicago School enterprise. Such governmental interventions in marketplace
decisions (decisions made by younger selves are replaced by subsidies and new
duties) are anathemas for Chicagoans, and Judge Posner could be understood to

19. Id.
20. Id. at 84-9 1. To adopt a unitary view, one must imagine a master self drawing up a single,
integrated life plan. See id. at 66-71, 84-88. See also id. at 267 ("'[D]econstructing' the self is the
sort of thing philosophers like to do.").
21. See generally id.at 84-95, 255-56, 263, 269, 280-81, 284, 358, 362.
22. Id. at 93. See also id. at 84, 362.
23. Id. at 269 ("[Blecause there is no satisfactory or acceptable analytical procedure for
balancing the claims of the young and of the old self, the current old, in effect as proxies for the
future old selves of the current young, struggle with the current young in the political marketplace
for the allocation of consumption over the life cycle.").
24. Id. at 263. We would add that this fiduciary duty helps to eliminate generational "free
riders": younger persons who make no provision for their older selves, in the hope that government
will care for them later. Circumstances permit the younger self to "cheat" the older one, and a
fiduciary duty minimizes this cheating by requiring the younger self to do what the older one would
require-if she could. See generally Alison Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness
and CorporateStructure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738 (1978).
25. AGING, supra note 6, at 264. See id.at 281 ("[miultiple-selves analysis-that normative
mischief maker-" shows how difficult are questions of the elderly's claims to governmental
resources); see also infra note 32 and accompanying text. It is unclear how this political arbitration
could succeed in the real world, since (by definition) all of the relevant successive selves are not in
existence at any given time.
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say that markets have failed our older selves-except that Chicagoans hate to
admit any instance of market failure. Also, their beloved and unitary economic
Derek Parfit shows how, in
man has suddenly become schizophrenic.
philosophical terms, a personal identity which changes over time makes
incommensurability into even more of a problem.' Neoclassical (including
Chicago School) economists have long insisted on the impossibility of
interpersonal comparisons of utility (satisfactions); Posner and Parfit would
make intrapersonal comparisons impossible as well. 7 A schizophreny of
selves may explain why we are not anywhere near as worried about
environmental spoliation or governmental budget deficits as we say we are in
public opinion polls, etc., but this road arguably leads to an analytical paralysis.
It is hard to see how Judge Posner's revisions represent much of an advance
over the standard version: the young discount future costs and benefits heavily,
but the discount rate declines as these same people grow older.'
Judge Posner's third and fourth modifications are applications of standard
moves in Chicago School economics: discovering equilibria between the young
and the old, and coming close to defining the elderly as a special interest group.
Neoclassical economists like Judge Posner sometimes fall prey to a naturalistic
fallacy in logic-that the kind of equilibria seen in biology, chemistry, and
physics necessarily governs human relationships as well: "There is a natural
though not necessarily an optimal equilibrium between the demands of the old
for support and the willingness of the young to supply that demand. " 9
Another "equilibrium involving support for the elderly by both the state and the
family may therefore be precarious, if state support leads to smaller families,
which in turn increases the cost to families of supporting their elderly
members."' Such social science equilibria are in the eyes of the beholder, and
much of Judge Posner's complex narrative is arguably more consistent with the

26. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984), cited in AGING, supra note 6, at 84 n.34,
313 n.26.
27. But see AGING, supra note 6, at 255 (citing to Thomas Schelling). An unrealistic example
of an irrevocable obligation to commit suicide at a future time certain illustrates the "problem of
Perhaps the game theorists can help us, by modeling the outcome
picking the authentic self ....
of bargaining between one's current and one's future self." Id. Suicide kills future selves and, if
these are indeed different persons, government can prohibit suicide without fear of a paternalistic
interference with the liberty of the younger self. Id. at 255-56. Posner uses J.S. Mill's definition

of liberty here. Id. at 238 (voluntary acts by competent adults can be prohibited only if they create
"tangible harms, as distinct from ... disapproval or even revulsion"). Posner clearly implies that
the "authentic self" can be discovered through "bargaining," without saying why and how.
28. See id. at 71, 358 (while age-divided selves are in conflict, they are also "connected by
bonds of altruism and personal identity far closer" than those of groups divided by race, gender or
sexual orientation).
29. Id. at 360. See id. at 289 ("There is thus a natural, though not necessarily an optimal,
political equilibrium in the struggle between young and old selves.").
30. Id. at 221.
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notion that governments try, imperfectly and half-heartedly, to fix persistent
disequilibria between reluctant younger people (or selves) and powerful older
people (or selves). But this would contradict the tendency in neoclassical
economics to find equilibria (almost) everywhere.
The power of older people comes very close to making them into a special
interest group for Judge Posner, a characterization of deep significance in
Chicago School economics. 31 The Judge sees democracy as a "cheap" method
for registering power, especially for "naturally weak groups" like the elderly,
but the process is "subject to deformation by pressure from interest groups. "32
The Judge presumes that there has never "been a society in which old people as
a whole have been as politically influential, as materially well-off, and,
probably, as happy as they are in modem American society, although they are
not revered." 3 The interests of the elderly are seen to have a focus and
homogeneity borrowed from Aristotle's analyses. They vote at a rate of 180%
of the youngest eligible group, but voting is more consumption than investment
as an activity-individual voters know that they cannot swing an election
unaided. 4 It became fashionable during the Reagan Administration to use

31. Id. at 288, 290-91 ("excessive redistribution to the old ... can be checked at less political
cost than many other redistributions extracted by interest groups"-by limiting transfers to the old
in advance, as when a 1983 law postponed full entitlement to social security from 65 to 67 in the
year 2023). See William Landes & Richard Posner, The Independent Judiciaryin an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877-78 (1975). See also Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism
and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1359 (1988) (citations omitted):
Special interest groups frequently obtain government help in extracting money from the
general public istaxpayers or consumers. .. . [Special interest groups] are relatively
easy to organize because they are small and their members have much to gain ...
ITihe public finds it difficult to protect itself: members . . . have small, individual
stakes in any piece of legislation, and the large number of people affected makes
organization difficult. . . . Most legislation, then, will really involve some rip-off of
the public, even if it purports to serve the public interest.
Id. The elderly are plausibly members of the public, rather than a special interest group. The
efforts of the AARP notwithstanding, their numbers are too large and their interests too diverse to
be organized effectively. For example, the elderly clearly lack the Petroleum Institute's and even
the Sierra Club's financial and organizational resources for influencing elections and policies in a
meaningful way.
32. AGING, supra note 6, at 213, 220. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Things are
not really so "cheap" under the elaborate American separation of powers and checks and balances
that are arguably designed to increase the transaction costs of power.
33. AGING, supra note 6, at 204. See id. at 288 (one source of the power of the elderly is
receiving public subsidies and making voluntary gifts and bequests); Id. at 292 (another source is
the valued contribution the elderly make to a political stability); Id. at 360 (the improved health and
wealth of the elderly makes them "less appealing objects of charity and solicitude," and they have
"more political power than other age groups").
34. Id. at 118, 148-49, 288. See id. at 118 (We might expect the elderly to be selfish, singleissue voters-"most people are convinced that what is good for themselves is good, period."). See
also id. at 223 (stating that the power of the elderly is a source of resentment by the young).
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"special interest group" to describe those with whom you disagree. Judge
Posner more or less avoids this kind of labeling, but he does seem to overstate
the political power and the uniformity of interest among the elderly.
B. Applications
Much of the force of Judge Posner's arguments lies in the details, so that
even a review of this length cannot do them full justice. The territory covered
by Aging is broad, and the side trips numerous. The Judge variously applies his
revised standard version of Chicago School analysis to work and leisure,
residence, voting, sex, driving, tortious and criminal matters, suicide and
euthanasia, pensions, age discrimination in employment, the special problems
and potentials of elderly judges and academics, and the aging of organizations.
Some of his well-supported, Chicago School conclusions are that the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) is a "response to largely nonexistent
problems," where modest costs of administration "appear to buy no benefits,"
and that "[t]he Age Discrimination in Employment Act is a particularly
misbegotten venture in tilting at the windmills of ageism . . . . " Even if
ageism and employer peculation of pensions are really no problem, as the Judge
argues,' his reluctance to leave these matters to the political wars between
37
generations is still a bit puzzling.
One other excursion in Aging's extensive tour deserves special
mention-Judge Posner's adroit treatment of that premier "geriatric
occupation"3-judging. Set against the foundation of Part One, where Posner
delivers the bad news that we all will suffer inevitable mental and physical
decline, 39 and the limited good news that most jobs do not require the
maximum capabilities of youth anyway,' ° Posner delivers the even better news
for judges: that aging has only a slight effect on the quality of judicial
opinions,41 as measured by the number of subsequent citations!2 (citations

35. Id. at 361.
36. Id. at 20, 204, 301-04, 320, 346-47, 351, 359.
37. See id. at 264 ("perhaps we can do no better than to allow the political process to arbitrate
the competing claims of successive selves"). Presumably, an excess of costs over benefits makes
the ERISA and especially the ADEA inefficient, from the Chicago perspective on resource
allocation. But these Acts are all about resource distribution, and many of Posner's arguments
suggest that markets (admittedly efficient allocative devices) have failed adequately to distribute
wealth to some or many of the elderly.
38. Id. at 180, 352. See id. at 180-96, 352-54.
39. Id. at 18.
40. Id. at 74-77.
41. Id. at 106, 184. See id. at 180-81 ("As a consequenceof the incompletely theorized nature
of law . . . experience plays a larger role in successful lawyering than abstract reasoning does.").
In fact, Posner argues that many elderly lawyers and judges would see an age-related decline in
abstract reasoning as a favorable description of themselves. Id. (quoting D. B. Bromley: "The old
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often by, we would add, other elderly judges). Although Posner acknowledges
his own premise that fluid intelligence (an Aristotelian creativity) declines with
age, he argues that much of judging involves the practical reason of reasoning
by analogy, a moving from particular to particular without the interposition of
the abstract reason at which the young excel.43 Perhaps this is so, but perhaps
only in matters of the common law; continental European judges (who tend to
retire earlier) make more and arguably better use of an abstract reason. In any
event, analogy is the weakest form of argument in logic," and it may be used
so extensively in America because it suits judges who are older and less
creative-a very real source of "gray power" over an influential profession
which the creative Judge Posner overlooks.'
The Judge presumably rejects such arguments because of
the backward-looking character of the judicial process. . . . [I]f society
swings to the left of where it was when the judges were young they
will want to tug it right, and if it swings to the right . . . they will
want to tug it left .... Although the adventurism of the Court during
the chief justiceship of Earl Warren may seem a dramatic
counterinstance, it is arguable that the liberal justices . . . were
enacting the values they had acquired in their youth-which for many
of them coincided with the New Deal. '
Along these lines, some or much of what is now going on judicially is indeed
a "dramatic counterinstance": an implementation of "Reagan Revolution"
values which have not otherwise been current in this country since the mid-

person is more literal, more concrete, more concerned with tangible and immediate impressions, less
able to detach himself from the particular example and consider the general class or principle, less

able to ignore the individual fact in order to think in hypothetical terms."). See also id.
at 193
(elderly judges have a desirable background knowledge of practices and usages within which case

facts arise); Id. at 194 (experience and disinterest are valuable in a vague judicial "wisdom").
42. Id. at 182-84.
43. Id. at 192.
44. Paul Brietzke, Public Policy: Contract,Abortion, and the CIA, 18 VAL. U. L. REV. 741,
758-59 (1984) (and sources cited therein). The central problem with argument by analogy is the
open texture of classification categories: "'Everything in the world is like and unlike everything else
.... .'" Id. at 758 (quoting Malcolm Sharp on analogies in contract law). A jumble of cases or
other authorities which do not support an abstract reasoning are nonetheless made amenable to

arguments by analogy by tailoring, omitting or assuming away inconvenient facts, rules or policies.

Id. at 758-59.
45. Elderly partners in elite law firms, who dominate litigation strategies in major corporate
and commercial cases, know how to appeal to their age-mates on the Bench, with a relational human
capital and with formalistic arguments that were tested in the law schools of long ago.
46. AGING, supra note 6, at 194-96. See id. at 195 (discussing the judges' "balance-wheel
function... of reducing the amplitude of swings inpublic policy").
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1920s, when very few of today's judges were even alive let alone young.
Furthermore, Judge Posner assumes that his "backward-looking" judges place
a great deal of "emphasis on adherence to precedent, " " a tendency not much
in evidence on several courts today-including the Judge's Seventh Circuit.'
Judge Posner characterizes his approach to aging both as "interdisciplinary"
and as one in which "economics wields the baton of [his] multidisciplinary
orchestra." 49 The latter characterization is much more accurate: evolutionary
biology, history, literature, a quasi-anthropology of "primitive" societies, and
psychology are all consulted briefly, and philosophy (Aristotle's and John Stuart
Mill's) is discussed in more detail, but there is almost no interpenetration among
these disciplines. Many valuable but isolated insights are gleaned and then
quickly folded into the Judge's economics, so that the enterprise turns on the
relevance of this economics as a perspective on aging. We have seen that
Posner's succession of selves50 creates a muddle in economic analysis. Most
troubling is the impact of this schizophreny of selves on the pivotal concept of
economic rationality. There is no logical limit to the number of successive
selves who emerge as we grow older, and no logical way to tell if one self stops
before another begins. The hitherto-relentlessly logical economic man must now
be sometimes or often divided or conflicted cruelly: the question of whether to
brush our teeth, perhaps so that our older selves have fewer cavities and more
companionship, begins to take on dimensions of the "Three Faces of Eve." We
risk becoming as paralyzed as those who would analyze our behavior, since a
rational and integrated self has now become an unrealistic (and imaginary)
master self who draws up a single life plan which is enforceable somehow."'
The Judge hopes to return to his rational utility maximizing model "once the

47. Id.
48. See Brietzke, supra note 44, at 758-59. An example from antitrust is instructive, all the
more so because Judge Posner did not participate in the decision. Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d
825 (7th Cir. 1995), is unsatisfactory in several respects, including a specious attempt, see id. at
828, to distinguish Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985).
Blackburn should rather have overruled Polk Bros. because Judge Easterbrook there ignores a

controlling and clearly contradictory Supreme Court precedent: United States v. Topco Associates,
405 U.S. 596 (1972). Any doubts about the continued vitality of Topco were definitively laid to
rest, before Blackburn was decided, in Palmer v. BRG of Georgia,Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990). The
Blackburn Court, correctly applies Topco and Palmer, but it seems unwilling to let Polk Bros.
go-perhaps because of a desire to conserve a relational human capital on the Seventh Circuit. See
Blackburn, 53 F.3d at 827.
49. AGING, supra note 6, at 1.
50. See supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
51. See AGING, supra note 6, at 89, n.47 (quoting John Rawls: "Rationality implies an
impartial concern for all parts of our life [so that] pure time preference is irrational . . . ."). But
see also id. at 93 ("'[E]xcessive' discounting of unpleasant future states, such as death or a bleak
old age, is consistent with, even implied by, rationality.").
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fundamental attributes of being old are understood," 52 but he may find the
model thrown out of the analytical window by his successive selves.
II.

LAW AND AGING-STEREOTYPES AND IMPLICATIONS

A. Stereotypes
To support his economic psychology of old age, Judge Posner asks us to

accept the following "fundamental attributes of being old": 53
"[T]here is such a thing as normal aging," S4 and it is "a process
one element of which is an inexorable decline across a broad range of
1.

bodily (including both physical and mental) capabilities." 55
2.

In addition to normal cognitive decline,'

aging causes a shift

from fluid intelligence (imagination) to crystallized intelligence
(experience), 5 7 and this "relation is one of substitution," rather than

"merely additive.'
3.

There is a "difference between one's young and one's old self

[which] may be so profound that the two selves are more fruitfully
viewed as two persons rather than as one.",9
4.

"[O]ld people are . . . on average . . . worse listeners and less

considerate

speakers than young people, " '

"pessimistic," "self-centered,"

and "shameless."

as well as more

61

52. Id. at 99. See id. at 135 (depression causes some suicides but, unless we give it a circular
definition, depression is difficult to distinguish from rational perceptions of a reduced quality and
prospects of life). See also id. at 272 (failing to give research "priority to life-threatening diseases
of the young would signify an inefficient allocation of resources"). But see supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
53. AGING, supra note 6, at 99.
54. Id. at 19 ("Resistance to the fact that there is such a thing as normal aging has become
common in our culture of heightened sensitivity.").
55. Id. at 18.
56. Id. at 20 ("Almost all elderly people experience a cognitive decline the symptoms of which
are difficult to distinguish from the earliest manifestations of dementia; yet in most the condition
does not prdgress to dementia.").
57. Id. at 67-68. See also id. at 6, 17, 18, 22-23, 67-71, 104, 112, 194.
58. Id. at 67. See also id. at 115.
59. Id. at 8-9. See also supra text accompanying notes 20-28.
60. Id. at 9. See also id. at 57, 108, 120, 175.
61. Id.at 104.
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The Judge is careful to intersperse this stereotypical portrayal of the aging and
aged with soft qualifiers,' 2 but his clever economic explanations for the
foregoing "fundamental attributes" depend on the reader's willingness to accept
such attributes as representative of the "central tendencies ' or "average " '
qualities of the elderly.
Posner walks a delicate tightrope with respect to his stereotypes. He
dismisses modem psychological studies as "not persuasive, "65 concluding that
"Aristotle's psychology of aging has not been superseded."'
While most
gerontologists and psychologists would agree that at present there is no
integrative theory by which to assimilate the rapidly growing gerontological
research data,' the inability to articulate one superior integrative theory of
aging seems an inadequate basis for wholesale dismissal of the wealth of
presently available information on aging.6
Despite a growing recognition among gerontologists that the "fundamental
epistemological problems" associated with modem gerontology "cannot be
resolved by methodological fiat, by improved positivistic 'rigor,' or by some

62. See, e.g., id. at 9 ("I argue, for example, that old people are (on average-always an
important qualification in dealing with large and amorphous social aggregates such as "the elderly")
worse listeners and less considerate speakers than young people."); Id. at 20 ("But that there is
increasing variability within age cohorts and overlap between persons in different age cohorts does
not refute the existence of normal aging; it assumes it.") (citation omitted). Id. at 23 ("Despite my
reference to 'inexorable' decline, symptoms of aging sometimes appear suddenly . . . and may
plateau rather than continue to grow worse.").
63. Id. at 101-02 (describing these "central tendencies" as "not the complete truth about the
old, but . . . an important part of the truth . . . the part that tends nowadays to be suppressed
because we live in an era of heightened sensitivity to any suggestion that any group defined by an
unalterable characteristic ... might be inferior to some other group ...
.
64. See, e.g., id. at 9.
65. Id. at 102.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., James E. Birren & Johannes J.F. Schroots, History, Concepts, and Theory in the
Psychology of Aging, in HANDBOOK OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AGING 6 (James E. Birren & K.
Warner Schaie eds., 4th ed. 1996) (noting the "profusion of research findings and the lack of
integrative theory in the psychology of aging"); Thomas R. Cole, Preface to VOICES AND VISIONS
OF AGING: TOWARD A CRITICAL GERONTOLOGY vii (Thomas R. Cole et al. eds., 1993) (observing
that "gerontology's vast and rapidly growing accumulation of empirical data cannot be assimilated
to existing theories or to any single, unified theory of aging").
68. In 1988, K. Warner Schaie observed:
There has been an explosion of knowledge in gerontology in general and in the
psychology of aging in particular. The publication rate of research relevant to the
psychology of adult development and aging has grown to more than 1000 articles and
chapters per year, and the novice entrant into the field may need some help and
guidance in a thoughtful effort at becoming oriented.
K. Warner Schaie, Ageism in PsychologicalResearch, 43 AM. PSYCHOL. 179, 179 (1988) (citation
omitted).
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form of physical, social, or psychological reductionism,"' Judge Posner clings
unreflectively to the stereotypes of aging and old age for which Aristotle is his
sole source of authority.'m Avoiding the complexity of psychological research
on cognitive functioning and personality in old age may be necessary to the
cohesiveness of Posner's economic psychology of aging, but ultimately such
convenient indifference undermines the credibility of Aging's promise to increase
our understanding of the behavior and attitudes associated with aging.7
A complete review of modem gerontological research is beyond the scope
of this essay, but several conclusions, about which there is increasing consensus,
are worth mentioning: (1) the degree and rate of aging varies among individuals
without regard to chronological age; (2) physiological and cognitive changes
tend to occur at different rates within the same individual; and (3) the elderly,
when defined as a group chronologically, are more heterogeneous than
homogeneous.'
Furthermore, there is increasing support for the theory that
cognitive decline is not integrally related to aging processes, but is instead a
function of close proximity to death.'
Posner pays lip service to these

69. Cole, supra note 67, at vii(quoting Harry R. Moody, and observing that epistemological
problems are inherent "where technical rationality generally ignores what cannot be reduced to

quantitative methodology even as it conceals value commitments and forms of domination").
70. See AGING, supra note 6, at 102.
71. Id.at 1-2.
72. See Birren & Schroots, supra note 67, at 10 (summarizing conclusions drawn from
longitudinal studies that "aging is at least in part an individualized process that differs among
individuals and among functions"); Id. at 17 ("Chronological age is an initially appealing false lover
who tells you everything and nothing."); Fred L. Bookstein & W. Andrew Achenbaum, Aging as
Explanation: How Scientific Measurement Can Advance Critical Gerontology, in VOICES AND
VISIONS OF AGING: TOWARD A CRITICAL GERONTOLOGY 20, 28-39 (Thomas R. Cole et al. eds.,

1993) (noting that "processes of aging do not proceed evenly with respect to the calendar," and
arguing for a new measure of "gerontological age" that would incorporate the "differential rates in
the dynamic processes of aging"). See also Meredith Minkler, Aging and Disability: Behind and
Beyond the Stereotypes, 4 J. AGING STUD. 246 (1990), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES IN SOCIAL
GERONTOLOGY 11, 12 (Robert B. Enright, Jr., ed., 1994) (noting the "substantive heterogeneity"
of the aging population, Minkler observed: "M[While 'downwardly sloping lines' may accurately be
drawn for aggregate population groups on such dimensions as vital capacity, there is in fact
considerably less clustering around the mean for older people than there is for their younger
counterparts."); Robert N. Butler, WHY SURVIVE?: BEING OLD IN AMERICA 7 (1975). Butler
debunks the myth of chronological aging by stating the following:
[There are great differences in the rates of physiological, chronological, psychological
and social aging within the person and from person to person. In fact, physiological
indicators show a greater range from the mean in old age than in any other age group,
and this is true of personality as well. Older people actually become more diverse
rather than more similar with advancing years.

Id.
73. See generally Stig Berg, Aging, Behavior, and Terminal Decline, in HANDBOOK OF THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF AGING 323 (James E. Birren & K. Warner Schaie eds., 4th ed. 1996). See also
Minkler, supra note 72, at 11-12 ("[L]ongitudinal studies . . . have demonstrated that, contrary to
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conclusions (which have little to do with the "last period" problem in
economics), 7' but never squares them with his assertions of the "central
tendencies" and "average" qualities of the aging and aged. If, as the more
recent studies appear to indicate, physiological and psychological aging happen
at very individualized rates both intrapersonally and interpersonally, then
defining "normal aging" by "central tendencies" is uninformative and
statistically indefensible.
Likewise, the "knowledge shift" from "fluid" to "crystallized" intelligence,
identified by Judge Posner as a fundamental attribute of old age, is also suspect.
He states: "If, as psychologists believe with considerable evidence, fluid
intelligence declines with age much faster than crystallized intelligence does, the
effect is to accentuate what I am calling the knowledge shift."" However, the
Judge fails to provide citation for this "considerable" body of psychological
"evidence," 76 and instead gives us only his implication based upon an
assumption he shares with Aristotle:
If the relation of experience to imagination were merely additive, the
accrual of experience with age could only enhance performance unless,
as I have yet to consider, age brings about a deterioration in
imaginative power. I am assuming with Aristotle, that the relation is
one of substitution, that experience displaces imagination. This
implies that imaginative power does in fact deteriorate with age,
although Aristotle himself . . . apparently did not notice this
implication.'
Adding to the mystique of this "knowledge shift," Posner's definitions of "fluid"
and "crystallized" are also simplistic and ambiguous.' Without the benefit of
more objective substantiation or precise definition, the reader must be willing
to accept the "knowledge shift" on blind faith in order to accompany Posner on
his travels through Aging.

myth, no significant decline in intellectual functioning occurs with aging for the majority of older
people, with the exception of the 'terminal drop' in cognitive ability that frequently occurs just prior
to death.") (citations omitted); Paul B. Baltes & K. Warner Schaie, Aging and IQ: The Myth of the
Twilight Years, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Mar. 1974, at 35, 36-37 (describing research results supporting
the "terminal drop" theory).

74. See, e.g., AGING, supra note 6, at 18 (noting the increasing proximity of death as a
nonsomatic element in the "inexorable" decline in capabilities); Id. at 20 (acknowledging "increasing
variability within age cohorts"); Id. at 23 (observing that "symptoms of old age do not all appear
at the same time or progress at the same rate"). See also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
75. Id. at 69.
76. Id. See also infra note 102 and accompanying text.
77. AGING, supra note 6, at 67-68.
78. Id. at 68-69.
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Although a meaningful critique of the knowledge shift paradigm is not
possible without more information about its underlying premises, observations
from current psychological studies of intellectual development in adulthood can
provide at least a counterbalance for the pilgrim of faith on the Aging journey.
Most current literature rejects the "decline and loss paradigm of normal
aging"' and concludes that for the majority of persons, age-related change in
cognitive abilities is a very slow process with only minimal declines of
insignificant functional consequence.80
Longitudinal studies (which are
performed with the same group of individuals over a long period of time) have
found that "substantial intellectual changes within individuals occur only late in
life and tend to occur for abilities that were less central to the individuals' life
experiences and thus perhaps less practiced.""' An interesting hypothesis
raised by such research is that intellectual decline may not be normative, but
rather a consequence of disuse 2 (which offers an alternative explanation for
why many elderly judges retain their frequently exercised intellectual powers).
Other issues that researchers continue to consider are whether the factorial
structure of tests used to measure cognitive functioning remain invariant across
age and time,' and whether testing methodologies can be adjusted to neutralize
inherent biases related to cohort differences.A4

B. Implications
If the Judge's fundamental attributes of old age are overstated, does it really
matter? Especially if they happen to hold true for even some, rather than the
majority, of the elderly? At the risk of being labelled overly-sentimental, 5 we

79. See Minkler, supra note 72, at 11-12. See also K. Warner Schaie, IntellectualDevelopment
in Adulthood, in HANDBOOK OF THIE PSYCHOLOGY OF AGING 266, 273 (James E. Birren & K.

Warner Schaie eds., 4th ed. 1996) (describing results from the Seattle Longitudinal Study conducted
over 35 years: "Although by age 60 virtually every subject had declined on one ability, few
individuals showed global decline. Virtually no one showed universal decline on all abilities
monitored, even by the 80s.").
80. See Schaie, supra note 79, at 270-71; Minkler, supra note 72, at 11-12. See also Schaie,
supranote 68, at 181-82 (discussing the importance of distinguishing between cognitive changes that
are only statistically significant, and those that are significant in terms of magnitude).
81. Schaie, supra note 79, at 270.
82. See id. at 279-80 (discussing reversibility of intellectual deficit through cognitive training).
83. Id. at 269.
84. Id. at 273-74. See also Schaie, supra note 68, at 180-81 (discussing selection of age and
cohort boundaries); Baltes & Schaie, supra note 73, at 36 (noting the importance of distinguishing
between changes in measured intelligence that are due to generational differences rather than
chronological age).
85. See AGING, supra note 6, at 359: "In many fields of endeavor, especially highly creative
fields, where fluid intelligence is more important to success than crystallized intelligence, the
declension of ability with age is very steep. It is sentimental to pretend otherwise, or to treat rare
exceptions as stating the rule." (emphasis added).
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think the answer must be yes. Robert Butler, who originally coined the term
"ageism" in 1968, wrote that "systematic stereotyping" of the old "allows the
younger generation to see older people as different from themselves. .. " and
to "subtly cease to identify with their elders as human beings. " " Although
Judge Posner assures us that old age "may be a more serious personal problem
than it is a social, an economic, or a political one," 87 the labelling of aging or
the elderly as a "problem," and the tendency to scapegoat at their expense, is
increasingly prevalent.' Not only do Posner's negative stereotypes have the
potential to fuel the fires of ageism; one must also consider the alienating
potential, both intrapersonally and interpersonally, of the multiple-self concept,
if taken too literally or seriously. Ageism has been described as a "vicious
cycle" because once the elderly are negatively stereotyped, people become more
reluctant to affiliate with them, thereby increasing the phenomena of avoidance
and alienation.'
We also cannot casually ignore the fact that it is a judge in Aging who is
affirming stereotypic views of the elderly. Perhaps because the law is viewed
by some as a weapon against ageism, the legal profession has been slow to selfreflect upon the impact of our individual and collective attitudes about age on
the ways that lawyers practice law, legislators formulate public policy, and
judges make decisions. A survey of guardianship statutes and adult-protective
statutes, for example, reveals an alarming number of jurisdictions that still
condone mere "old" or "advanced age" as an independent basis for terminating
personal and legal autonomy through institution of guardianshipl'
or

86. Robert N. Butler, Dispelling Ageism: The Cross-Cutting Intervention, ANNUALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., May 1989, at 138-39.
87. AGING, supra note 6, at 50.
88. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 86, at 140-41 (observing that current manifestations of ageism
include both envy and resentment of the elderly-envy of affluent elderly for their economic
successes, and resentment of the poor elderly for their ostensible burden on public benefits and tax
expenditures). Dr. Butler concludes that there is universal fear of the increasing older population
based on notions that such a population "will become unaffordable, lead to stagnation of the
society's productive and economic growth, and generate intergenerational conflict." Id. at 142. See
also Harold L. Sheppard, Damaging Stereotypes About Aging Are Taking Hold: How to Counter
Them?, PERSP. ON AGING, Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 4; Robert H. Binstock, The Aged as Scapegoat, 23
GERONTOLOGIST 136 (1983).
89. See Gordon D. Jensen & Fredericka B. Oakley, Ageism Across Cultures and in Perspective
of Sociobiologic and Psychodynamic Theories, INT'L J. AGING & HUM. DEv., 1982-83, at 17, 25.
90. ALA. CODE § 26-2A-130(c)(1992) (listing "physical or mental infirmities accompanying
advanced age" as a basis for appointment of a conservator or other protective order); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 93-13-251 (1994) (permitting appointment of a conservator "if a person by reason of
advanced age . . . is incapable of managing his own estate"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-409(2)(a)
(1995) (permitting conservatorship if "person is unable to manage his property and affairs effectively
for reasons such as . . . advanced age"); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 159.019 (Michie 1993)
("'Incompetent' includes any person who, by reason of ... advanced age . . . is unable, without
assistance, properly to manage and take care of himself or his property."); N.D. CENT. CODE §
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involuntary submission to protective services. 9' And, case law confirms that
there are still judges who are willing to reinforce such notions through
adjudication.' At what point does a stereotype, a "central tendency," become
a rebuttable presumption against which the elderly must defend themselves to
maintain the same rights and privileges in society as the non-elderly?

30.1-29-01(2)(a) (1976) (appointment of conservator permitted if court determines that person "is
unable to manage [his] property and affairs effectively for reasons such as ... advanced age"); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 33-16-2(3) (1995) (definition of conservator in veterans' guardianship statute "shall
mean any person acting as a fiduciary for the estate of any 'ward' who by reason of advanced age

or mental weakness is unable to properly care for his or her estate"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5101(1) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1995) ("'Incapacitated person' means any person who is impaired by

reason of... advancedage .... "); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-11-101(7) (Supp. 1995) ("'Disabled
person' means any person ... determined by the court to be in need of partial or full supervision,
protection and assistance by reason of ... advanced age."); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 880.01(4) (West
1991 & Supp. 1995) ("'Incompetent' means a person adjudged by a court of record to be
substantially incapable of managing his or her property or caring for himself or herself by reason
of infirmities of aging .... "); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3-1-101(a)(vii) (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1995)
("'Incompetent person' means an individual who is unable unassisted to properly manage and take

care of himself or his property as a result of the infirmities of advanced age ....
).
91. ALA. CODE §§ 38-9B-1(a)(1), -2(11) (1975 & Supp. 1994) (family trust board of trustees
statutes which include "age" among the causal bases of impairment); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46451(A)(5) (West 1956 & Supp. 1995) (adult protection statute including in the definition of
incapacity "an impairment by reason of... advanced age"); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/103(4)
(West 1993 & Supp. 1996) ("'Elder adult with disabilities' means an adult prevented by advanced
age from taking appropriate action to protect himself or herself from abuse by a family or household
member."); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-10-3-2(a)(2) (West 1994) ("incapable by reason of... old age");
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 13-101(c)(2) (1991) (a "destitute parent" is one who "cannotbe selfsupporting, due to old age . . . ."); MJCH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.145m(u)(i) (West 1991 &
Supp. 1996-1997) ("'Vulnerable adult' means ... [a]n individual ... who, because of age ...
requires supervision or personal care or lacks the personal and social skills required to live
independently."); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5101.60(B) (Banks-Baldwin 1994) (containing slightly
ageist language in the definition of "Adult": "any person sixty years of age or older within this state
who is handicapped by the infirmities of aging. .. ."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 10-103(5)
(West 1990 & Supp. 1996) ("'Incapacitated person' means any person . . . who is impaired by
reason of. . . advanced age.
."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-35-10(11) (Law Co-op. 1976 & Supp.
1995) ("'Vulnerable adult' . . . includes a person who is impaired in the ability to adequately
provide for the person's own care or protection because of the infirmities of aging including, but not
limited to . . . advanced age . . . . "); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-102(2) (1995) ("'Adult' means a
person ... who because of... advanced age is unable to manage such person's own resources.
: . . "); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-55.2 (Michie 1995) ("'Incapacitated person' means any adult who
is impaired by reason of ... advanced age . . . ."); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 55.01(3) (West 1987 &
Supp. 1995) ("'Infirmities of aging' means organic brain damage caused by advanced age ..
").
92. For examples of cases where mere advanced age was the only basis reported for imposition
of guardianship, see In re Estate of Clark, 772 P.2d 299, 300-01 (Mont. 1989); In re Krische, No.
49012, 1985 WL 9038 at * 1, 3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 23, 1985); First Nat'l Bank of Pulaski v. Estate
of Bedford, No. 01-A-019007CH00236, 1991 WL 139715 at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 1991).
For examples of cases where old age was one of the factors considered in determining undue
influence in will and trust contest cases, see Montoya v. Torres, 823 P.2d 905, 909-10 (N.M. 1991);
In re Estate of Maheras v. Cook, 897 P.2d 268, 273 (Okla. 1995); Cale v. Napier, 412 S.E.2d 242,
245 (W. Va. 1991).
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Lastly, the most significant and serious impact of sanctioned negative age
stereotypes may not be upon intergenerational relationships, but upon the selfconcept of elders. Negative stereotypes can and do become self-fulfilling
prophecies." To the extent that we will all become old if we are lucky, these
stereotypes are really messages about our own value and the meaning of our
later life." Judge Posner may be the first in the field of law and economics
to capitalize on "oldness," but he must stand in a long line of others who
(perhaps for even laudatory or paternalistic reasons) have used negative
stereotypes of old age in self-serving ways to gain support for research grants,
new programs, or their livelihoods.95 As a society, we are only beginning to
see the costs of such self-serving benefits.

93. See Robert N. Butler, Ageism, ACROSS THE BOARD, Nov. 1980, at 31, 32 (observing that
"people can convince themselves to act according to stereotype-to think of themselves as
unproductive, decrepit, and passive"); BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FOUNTAIN OF AGE 101 (1993)
(quoting Ven Bengston's characterization of the relationship between intellectual functioning and
aging as a feedback loop: "'Once begun, this loop initiates a cycle of self-fulfilling prophecies that
is buttressed by mythologies and stereotypes surrounding socially held views of "normal" aging.'");
Glenda Laws, Understanding Ageism: Lessons from Feminism and Postmodernism, 35
GERONTOLOGIST 112, 113 (1995) (noting that "oppressed groups for a variety of reasons-conscious
and unconscious, strategic and intuitive-often choose to adopt a particular identity"); William C.
Thomas, Jr., The Expectation Gap and the Stereotype of the Stereotype: Images of Old People, 21
GERONTOLOGIST 402, 404 (1981) (highlighting the role of "congruence between what is expected
as appropriate and what the person doing the expecting perceives as happening" in the concept of
well-being).
94. See Butler, supra note 93, at 31.
95. See JOHN McKNIGHT, THE CARELESS SOCIETY:

COMMUNITY AND ITS COUNTERFEITS

(1995). McKnight argues that our society's need for more service income has encouraged the
"commodification of age." Id. at 32. He describes the phenomenon as follows:
The economic use of classifying "oldhood" as a problem serves two purposes. The first
is that it produces more service jobs by classifying old people as problems. Second, by
the very act of classification it also defines old people as less productive or
nonproductive and diminishes their capacity to compete for jobs. Thus, we create more
jobs for one class by diminishing the job capacity of another. Indeed, one might say
that what has -happened in the United States since World War II is that those people of
middle years have needed "problems" called old and young in order to create more
"needs" while diminishing the number of people eligible to meet the needs.
Id. at 31. See also FRIEDAN, supra note 93, at 58, who quotes from a letter received from a
nurse/social worker stating:
So many of these programs are really ageist and work toward increased dependence of
the elderly and increased segregation as opposed to working toward integration and
independence. I worry sometimes about the giant network that has been established to
help with "problems" of the aged, i.e., senior centers, nutrition meal sites, etc. It seems
to me they have added to the problem and now work toward securing enough resources
to keep themselves and their programs funded.
Id. at 58. Friedan also quotes David Gutmann, a geropsychologist, for the proposition that "the
science of gerontology has shared, worked within, and perpetuated the conventional American view
of 'aging as catastrophe, aging as wasteland.'" Id. at 71 (citing DAVID GUTMANN, RECLAIMED
POwERs 2, 7 (1987)).
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III. CONCLUSION

Although Judge Posner has argued impressively that at least one group of
older selves, judges, is able to dictate canons of rationality,' if the old are not
as powerful as Judge Posner suggests, younger selves will often determine the
content of rationality in a market economy. Collectively, the young have the
resources (money, labor-power, and creativity) to define and determine market
outcomes, ceding only a few "niches" to the elderly, and the advertising and
media images we are supposed to emulate are mostly young, as well as thin and
(except for Michael Jordan) with a full head of hair.' Judge Posner discusses
an "Altersstil (old-age style), toward boldness, clarity, and directness, and away
from artifice."' This style is more praised by (often elderly) critics than it is
rewarded by markets, however, since it is mostly indifferent to the fashions and
audience expectations that are defined primarily by the young. Like that of
"homemakers," the value of work done by the elderly (their productivity) tends
to be underestimated because much more of it is nonmarket and nonpecuniary.
To say that this work is directed to the satisfaction of the elderly is vacuous,
since all of work has this function in economics; even the "production" of
leisure is a source of wealth." Some of the means and ends of the elderly are
radically different from those of the young, and the elderly will appear
irrational-by-definition if they are evaluated under young people's criteria.
Judge Posner, or someone else, may have to purge a pivotal economic
rationality of ageist biases before it can serve as a neutral analytical tool.

96. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
97. See FRIEDAN, supra note 93, at 35-39 (summarizing studies of prime-time television
dramas, commercials, magazines, and advertisements that reveal very few images of older people).
See also RICHARD A. LEE, AGEISM IN ADVERTISING: A STUDY OF ADVERTISING AGENCY
ATTITUDES TOWARDS MATURING AND MATURE CONSUMERS 12-13, 29 (1995) (report presented at
the American Society on Aging National Convention in March 1995) (concluding that the majority
of advertising agency professionals are young adults who regard older consumers as "a lot of poor
people with little consumer potential").
98. AGING, supra note 6, at 174.
99. See id. at 44 ("retirement" is ill-specified, since many retirees take up other "jobs" which
are nonmarket or voluntary); Id. at 49 (the shift of many from feeling old to less-old, because of an
upward adjustment in the perceived onset of old age, represents a massive shift of utility, to
themselves and their families); Id. at 225 (the Darwinian notion that the world is progressing
contradicts elders' perceptions of a regression and favors the optimistic and forward-looking young).
But see id. at 103 (discussing Aristotle's perceptions of the young as hot-tempered, fickle,
preoccupied with honor, naively optimistic, easily cheated, and know-it-all). Judge Posner may
draw a distinction without a relevant difference. Id. at 348 (The ADEA has "reduced the average
retirement age, inducing an inefficient substitution of leisure for work."). Leisure and work both
generate wealth (satisfaction), but only work receives compensation in the marketplace. While the
market may thus seem to make this substitution inefficient, the employer's and the older person's
satisfaction may both be increased by a combination of enhanced leisure and a "golden handshake"
for retiring earlier.
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This is not to say that an economics perspective on aging lacks distinct
advantages, especially as an "economics of information." The Judge notes that
"[w]e are acutely conscious of the costs of the aging of the American population
Public policies about the elderly will
and tend to overlook the benefits.""
thus tend to be irrational, assuming that they actually turn on under-informed
cost-benefit analyses rather than on plays in naked power politics. Posner finds
that we try to make up for our informational shortfalls by "stereotyping"-by
Based
attributing to all old people the average characteristics of the group.'
on this stereotyped "information" and the "explanatory and predictive theory of
old age" which he sets out in Parts One and Two of Aging, Judge Posner
endeavors in the remainder of the book to discuss normative issues."rc While
there may be no dominant paradigm for the study of aging as of yet, 3 the
absence of a genuinely interdisciplinary approach in Aging arguably leaves four
of the Judge's crucial and controversial "normative" statements unsupported by
their surrounding analyses.
The first such freestanding statement is that "[h]owever much benefits are
cut, our society is not going to allow elderly people to be abandoned. It will
defray the costs of their medical care and basic life needs by hook or by crook
.

.

.

., '

How so, when "our society" is not altruistic or caring; the

homeless and ghetto youth have been more or less "abandoned" already. The

100. Id. at 50.
101. Id. at 322, 359. See id. at 360 (stating that the costs of information about people leads
to an underestimation or overestimation of their qualities). A 1986 decision by Judge Posner
arguably demonstrates the prevalence of such informational stereotypes about the elderly. See
United States v. Wolf, 787 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir. 1986). In the course of reversing Wolf's Mann Act
conviction, Judge Posner observed that "Miss Or ... had a history of serious physical and mental
illness, and some of her testimony, in particular that Wolf had had sexual intercourse with her every
night for two consecutive weeks, was sufficiently improbable to raise doubts about her credibility."
Id. at 1099. Dissenting on this and other grounds, Senior District Judge Campbell (appointed by
President Roosevelt in 1940) stressed the "high-level hair-splitting analysis of the majority," id. at
1105, and the majority's doubt that
it was physically possible for defendant Wolf, a 67-year-old man, to maintain an
erection every night for a two-week period. Yet the majority's "scholarly factual
findings" in this area are unsubstantiated and in need of expert certification. I see no
cite from Masters & Johnson, Dr. David Reuben, Dr. Ruth Westheimer, or another
authority in support of the majority's improper self-impeachmentof Ms. Or's testimony;
testimony the jury believed.
Id. at 1102.
102. AGING, supra note 6, at 235.
103. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
104. AGING, supra note 6, at 44. See id. at 293 ("[lIt is not politically feasible either to deny
the elderly medical care ... or to abandon them should they need home care." Society "will pay
in one way or another unless people are forced to save more for their old age."). Judge Posner
purports to separate out normative issues in his analyses, id. at 235-97, but his classification seems
unpersuasive.
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homeless may be thought crazy or otherwise unattractive to many, but the Judge
says that we seem "genetically programmed to feel protective toward
children "c'° but not toward the elderly. The elderly have an economic and
political power which the homeless and ghetto youth lack, of course, but it is
possible to imagine a governing political coalition which excludes most of the
elderly (especially the impoverished ones) and their interests.
A second normative statement is in disguise and holds that "most young
people become old people, so in a sense they are transferring money to
themselves.""
This is close to a non sequitur, since transfers to oneself are
markedly inadequate in the aggregate. This is indeed why we have (as of this
writing) Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and other programs which involve
younger taxpayers in a partial support of elders who are not relatives. These
partial subsidies will work only so long as the "social contract" is not ruptured,
so long as the young have the economist's "rational expectation" that they will
also be supported when they become old, by those who are currently even
younger."
The minuet recently danced by Congress suggests that this social
contract is coming apart, a fact certainly not lost on younger Americans.
Third, the Judge tells us: "I set to one side religious objections to suicide,
not because I consider them unanswerable, but because they belong to the
domain of individual choice rather than to that of social policy. "" We might
think of good, First Amendment reasons why this is so, and Posner gives us
John Stuart Mill's reasons. 9 Such reasons are unlikely to stop today's
politicians or Supreme Court, however, especially as Judge Posner himself gives
the reasons little credence while recommending a state-level political action over
0
euthanasia. "1
Saving the best for last, the Judge states "my assumption, heretofore tacit,
[is] that there is some mechanism by which policies that are beneficial to a

105. Id. at 202.
106. Id. at 48.
107. See id. at 208-09 (In a "primitive" society, an inculcated filial piety "takes the place of
legal enforcement ...
of the implicit . . . intergenerational contract in which parents support
children when young in exchange for support by the children in the parents' old age."); Id. at 284,
288 (citing to Gary Becker with respect to an "intergenerational contract" inwhich the old lend to
the young who can then obtain human capital through the public school system, and the old are then
possibly over-repaid by the young when they retire);
Id. at 361 (government subsidies replace
voluntary transfers from younger to older selves, and socialize the costs of supporting one's elder

parents).
108. Id. at 238.
109. Id. (Voluntary acts by competent adults can be prohibited only ifthey create "tangible
harms, as distinct from ...disapproval or even revulsion.").
110. Seeid. at 260-61.
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society are adopted by it.""' Such a deus ex machina, the socio-legal
equivalent of the Philosopher's Stone which perhaps amounts to a tautology or
a can opener,"' makes the book and this review superfluous; rest assured that
everything will be all right, at least in the long run.
These four normative statements are so freestanding, so divorced from the
rest of the analysis, because neoclassical or Chicago School economics is so
relentlessly positivist an enterprise. Judge Posner inadvertently illustrates David
Hume's dictum on the impossibility of deriving an "ought" (a normative
statement) from an "is" (a positive statement). To the extent we want to deal
with aging in a normative fashion, then, Chicago School economics may not be
the best overall perspective to adopt. As Thomas Cole so eloquently noted in
The Journey of Life: "Recent critiques of aging in the modem life course have
...reflected a dawning awareness that aging is much more than a problem to
be solved. In some quarters, it is becoming clear that accumulating health and
wealth through the rationalized control of time and the body is an impoverished
vision of what it means to live a life."" 3

111. Id. at 212-13.
112. See the "joke" about a physicist, an engineer, and an economist shipwrecked on a desert
island. A crate of canned goods iswashed ashore, and the physicist tries to bum open a can by
focusing the sun on it with his eyeglass lenses. The scheme fails, and the engineer's system of rocks
and levers fails to crush the top of a can. The economist then suggests that they "solve the problem
the way an economist would: assume a can opener."
113. THoMAs R. COLE, THE JOURNEY OF LIFE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AGING IN AMERICA

241 (1992).
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